Abstract: In the context of fixed market prices for the selected set of goods to be manufactured, supply network formation problems have been previously analyzed as cooperative linear production games. In particular, the profit sharing problem among partners of the winning coalition has been solved by a perfectly competitive solution, called the Owen set. Now, if an enterprise network decides to organize itself as a supply chain and imposes the wholesale price of its manufactured goods, then the supply chain design problem under a price elastic random demand from the market can be formulated as a biform game, combining a strategic subgame with a cooperative subgame. The decision variables of the strategic subgame are the wholesale prices and the retail prices of the goods, while the results of the cooperative subgame are the winning coalition and the payoff profile associated with it. The optimal global value function is then computed as the solution of a quadratic programming problem. In this scheme, the enterprise network plays the role of the Stackelberg leader and the retailer the role of the follower. The paper studies this type of biform games. In particular, it shows the existence of a payoff policy that is fair, efficient and individually rational.
INTRODUCTION
This paper proposes a new supply chain model based on game theory. In the context of international projects such as the European coordinated action CODESNET (2009) , it has been observed that some networks of manufacturers have now organized themselves both internally, in a cooperative manner, by sharing their products and resources, and externally, as dominant strategic actors relatively to their suppliers and customers. The concept of co-opetition, coined by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) , can be useful to analyze such new structures of power and trade. However, in this paper, competition does not only emerge from the cooperative game between manufacturers. It is also the leading trend of the profit sharing mechanism between manufacturers and retailers.
Biform games have been introduces by Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) to describe situations in which a supply chain agent needs to make strategic decisions in a competitive environment. This hybrid model has been adopted in several SCM literatures. In particular, Anupindi et al. (2001) analyzed a decentralized distribution system composed of independent retailers. In the first stage, before demand realization, each retailer makes its own decision on how much to order. In the second stage, after observing the demands, the retailers can cooperate by reallocating their inventories and allocating the corresponding additional profit. The authors have shown that this biform game has a nonempty core and have constructed an allocation mechanism based on dual solution and contained in the core of the game. Plambeck and Taylor (2005) studied a model with two original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) who sell their capacity to the contract manufacturer (CM). In the first stage, the OEM non-cooperatively choose their capacity and innovation levels. In the second cooperative stage, the manufacturers pool their capacity and negotiate the allocation of the additional profit obtained from capacity pooling.
In Chatain and Zemsky (2007) , a biform game approach is used to model a buyer-supplier relationship. First, suppliers make initial proposals and take organizational decisions. This stage is analyzed using a non-cooperative game theory approach. Then, suppliers negotiate with buyers who seek to outsource two tasks. In this stage, a cooperative game theory is applied to characterize the outcome of bargaining among the player over how to distribute the total surplus. Each supplier's share of the total surplus is the product of its added value and its relative bargaining power.
The quadratic production game of this paper is defined as a biform game that combines a strategic game between a manufacturers' network and the market, and a cooperative game within the manufacturing network. In the strategic game, the manufacturing network is supposed to dominate the market, who acts as a Stackelberg follower. The consumers' optimization problem determines the market prices on the basis of the wholesale prices imposed by manufacturing network.
2 SOME PRELIMINARIES ON GAME THEORY Biform games combine strategic games with cooperative games. Some preliminaries on both types of games are useful to understand this study.
Strategic games.
Classically, a non-cooperative static game is a collection
is a finite set of players with N = card( N ), X is a set of decisions available for each player i, 1, … … , N and , , … . , represent the utility (or payoff) received by each player. The payoff of each player depends on the strategy chosen by all the players. Given an N-players game, player i aims to choose a strategy that maximizes his utility function π x , x , given that the other players' strategy is summarized by decisions … … . Then, the best strategy of player i is defined by:
, .
Definition 2.1 Nash equilibrium
A set of actions x , x , … . , x is a Nash equilibrium of the game if:
In the normal form of the game, each player i selects his optimal strategy x assuming that all the other players also use the locally optimal strategy x . From this definition, a Nash equilibrium is a set of actions from which no player can improve the value of his utility function by unilaterally deviating from it.
Stackelberg games are strategic games with 2 players. They are also called leader-follower games. They are not in the normal form since they are dynamic with 2 steps. The leader plays first, anticipating the decision of the follower, and the follower has no other choice than to act optimally as anticipated by the leader. Such games generally reach a compromise situation, called the Stackelberg equilibrium.
The leader's optimal decision, denoted x , is computed recursively from the knowledge of the follower's optimal response function x x :
x argmax π x , x x and x x x . (2)
TU-cooperative games.
Classically, a cooperative game involves a finite set of N players, denoted 
A feasible payoff profile is a vector
. With every coalition S we associate a payoff ) (S u defined by:
Several properties will now be defined.
Definition 2.2: Efficiency (Pareto optimality)
The feasible payoff profile
is said to be efficient (or Pareto optimal) if and only if
Definition 2.3: Rationality
A feasible payoff profile
is said to be rational if the payoff of every coalition S is larger than its value ) (S v :
Definition 2.4: Core
The core of a TU-game is the set of feasible payoff profiles
that satisfy conditions (3) and (4). Namely, it is the set of feasible payoff profiles that are both efficient (Pareto optimal) and rational.
As in Gillies (1959) , the core is defined as:"the set of feasible outcomes that cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players".
Definition 2.5: Optimal coalition
The optimal cardinality of the TU-game
Definition 2.6. Convexity
A TU cooperative game is convex if and only if:
3 THE SUPPLY CHAIN MODEL
The market game
Consider a retailer selling on a market a set of products numbered i=1,…,n. In the market game between the retailer and the set of customers, the retailer plays first, by proposing a price vector p=(p 1 …p n ) T and the market reacts by buying a quantity that depends on this price and on its habits and requirements. The supply-demand negotiation game can be represented as an iterative process. The current price ) (t p i is the decision variable fixed by the retailer and the currently purchased quantity, ) (t y i ,is the decision variable of the market. Different models of the market reaction function can be investigated. Let (t) Y i and (t) P i be the vectors of present and past quantities and prices purchased by customers at periods t,t-1, t-2,…t-h+1, with h the system memory, supposed finite.
In a generic manner, we write:
. For each product i=1,…,n, the market game is supposed to reach a stable equilibrium for which the expected quantity i y sold over a reference period, satisfies
be the output vector of products during a reference period. Equation (8) is called the demand curve. As in Lariviere and Porteus (2001) , the retailer faces the inverse demand curve obtained from the optimality conditions of the market game. The products being assumed independent, the inverse demand curve for each product i=1,…,n is:
Quantities and prices being nonnegative, a necessary condition for equations (9) to be valid is :
By convention, condition (10) 
The retailer's problem
For each final product sold on the market, the retailer faces a stochastic demand. Considering the price-dependent expected quantity sold, i y for i=1,…,n, the expected profit of the retailer over the reference period is :
The price vector, is obtained from (9) in the form: The objective is to find the optimal vector that maximize ∏ , with:
The optimality condition takes the following form:
And since 0, the criterion is strictly concave and admits a single optimal solution. For each product, the optimal expected demand is:
The non negativity of this quantity derives from inequalities in (10) and (12). Accordingly, the proposed retail price is derived from (9):
( 1 7 ) It is assumed that the vector of wholesale prices, w, is determined by the manufacturer's network, who acts as a Stackelberg leader. It is related to the output vector y, by:
Then, as a Stackelberg follower, the retailer reacts by choosing the retail prices (17) that maximize his expected profit. From (11), (17), (18), the retailer expected profit is:
The manufacturers' network
Consider a network of N firms represented by numbers in the set   N ,..., 1  N . These firms are willing to cooperate to produce commodities and sell them in a market. The N manufacturers compete to be partners in a coalition N . Each candidate enterprise is characterized by its production resources: manufacturing plants, machines, work teams, robots, pallets, storage areas, etc. Mathematically, each firm owns a vector , , … . . , , , 1 … … . . , of R types of resources. These resources can be used, directly or indirectly to produce the vector , … . . , of final products. The coalition incurs manufacturing costs , … . . , per unit of each final product and sells the products at the wholesale price vector , … . . , to the retailer who acts as an intermediate party between the manufacturers' network and the final consumers.
Under a wholesale price contracts, the coalition of manufacturers acts as the Stackelberg leader by fixing the wholesale price vector w as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. As the follower, the retailer can only accept or reject the manufacturer's proposal. It is assumed that the retailer agrees to conclude any contract, provided that he obtains an expected profit greater than his opportunity cost which is set equal to zero by convention. After the manufacturers network has set the vector of wholesale prices, w, the retailer determines p (or equivalently ) to maximize his expected profit. Having anticipated the retailer's reaction function (13), the coalition determines to maximize his expected profit. The pair of optimal vectors , can thus be determined by the manufacturers' network. 
The manufacturers' game
At the manufacturing stage, two different problems must be solved: the strategic problem of selecting the wholesale price vector w, and the cooperative problem of optimizing the production vector y and the coalition characteristic vector .
S e
The profit optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
For a given vector w, problem (22) characterizes a cooperative game, namely the Linear Production Game (LPG) studied in Owen (1975) and Hennet and Mahjoub (2009) . In the biform game studied in this paper, variables are decision variables with optimal values related to the optimal output values through relations (18). Acting as the Stackelberg leader in the strategic game with the retailer, the manufacturing network anticipates the optimal reaction of the retailer by substituting equations (18) into the objective function of problem (22). The obtained set of quadratic programming problems (P) defines a quadratic production game denoted (QPG).
Maximize , ∑

Subject to ( P)
, 0,1 4 THE QUADRATIC PRODUCTION GAME By assuming exogenous prices imposed by the market, the LPG describes a competitive economic situation. On the contrary, the quadratic production game (QPG) described in this paper is more appropriate to describe an oligopolistic situation in which the manufacturing network imposes its decisions to the retailer who himself has a dominant position over customers and imposes the retail prices. In this context, the QPG addresses the three following issues:
 the profit maximization problem for the manufacturing network considered as a whole,  the coalition decision problem through the choice of vector S e ,  the problem of profit allocation to the members of the optimal coalition.
Global profit maximization
Consider a coalition S, N  S . The maximal profit that can be obtained by this coalition is obtained as the solution of the following problem, denoted (P S ):
Formally, problem (P S ) is similar to problem (P), except for the fact that in problem (P), is a vector of decision variables, while in problem (P S ), vector is the fixed characteristic vector of the investigated coalition, S. The following result can be derived from the comparison of problems (P S ) for different coalitions N S  . The optimal solution of problem (P S ), denoted ) (S v , is obtained for the output vector denoted . and Be S Be N . Then, the optimal solution of (P S ) is feasible for (P N ) and the maximal expected profit can be obtained as the optimal solution of (P N ).
The global profit maximization problem can thus be solved through solving (P N ) instead of (P), with the advantage of solving a problem in which all the variables are continuous.
It can be noticed that property 4.1 does not imply optimality of the grand coalition is the sense of definition. It may happen that some coalitions with smaller cardinality than N also yield the optimal expected profit.
Profit allocation in a coalition
From definition 2.4, any profit allocation policy in the core of the QPG is efficient and rational. Other properties can differentiate allocations. In particular, it is desirable to relate profit allocations of players to their marginal contribution to the value function. Classically (see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , the marginal contribution of player i to coalition N  S with S i  is defined by:
A particular allocation policy, introduced by Shapley (1953) has been shown to possess the best properties in terms of balance and fairness. It is called the Shapley value, and defined by : is the set of players preceding i in the ordering r.
Furthermore, the following result applies (Shapley, 1971 ):
Property 4.2 If the QPG is convex, the Shapley value allocation is in the core.
Unfortunately, convexity is not guaranteed in general for the QPG, as it is illustrated in the example. It is then possible to differentiate coalitional rationality (not verified in general) from individual rationality. Finally, the manufacturers' game can be solved in a fair, efficient and individually rational manner through the following steps:
1. Solve problem ( N P ) to obtain the maximal profit and the optimal output vector y, 2. Set the wholesale price vector w computed by (18), 3. Set the market price vector p computed by (17), 4. Compute the Shapley value allocation (24) to allocate the expected profit among the partners.
Computation of the Shapley value allocation requires computing the solution of all the problems (P S ) for N  S , and this, of course, can be very time consuming for large sets of manufacturing partners. 
